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Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century, as global flows emanate from North America and from all
around the world to stream across our continent in every direction, the enhanced border between
Canada and the United States of America appears strangely enigmatic. Due to the immense pressure
on the one hand to step up security, and the almost equally strong imperative on the other to
expedite crossing, the border has been re-invented to enable the rapid crossing of some goods and
services, and some people (Konrad and Nicol, 2008; Brunet-Jailly, 2007). Others wait for what may
indeed become intolerable, uneconomic and uncertain outcomes. Two increasingly separate and
differentiated positions have emerged to explain this situation. Some see the border as necessarily
more definitive, enforced, divisive, and secured. In their estimation it needs to be that way to ensure
security. For others, the border has become problematic with snarled traffic, contradictory
regulation, invasive enforcement and rapid, unpredictable change. They are concerned and often
alarmed by the changes they see and experience. Their reactions, combined with highly publicized
border incidents, have created an imagined barrier above and beyond the visible security
enhancements at the boundary. The result is an altered human geography of the Canada-U.S.
borderlands. There is an imperative to understand this new geography, and to approach the subject
with new border thinking (Agnew, 2008; Van Houtum, 2005; Walters, 2006). A decade has passed
since the events of 9/11, yet insecurity prevails and the border appears more fortified than ever. All
of the efforts to ostensibly build a better border—new and more infrastructure, expanded
regulation, giant leaps in technology application, many more new personnel—have yet to produce a
border that works for both Canadians and Americans in the 21st century.
Will the U.S.-Canada border in time work quietly and effectively as it apparently did before 9/11?
Or, will the changes at the border continue to produce complications and extend the difficulties of
operating, managing, enforcing, negotiating, and, ultimately, crossing the border between Canada
and the United States? Is the border ‘broken’ as some pundits would lead us to believe? Does the
United States need a ‘virtual wall’ to separate it from Canada? Or, can the stresses, strains and
fractures be examined, treated and mended to form a ‘bionic’ successor to the aging and outdated
“longest undefended border in the world?” Inherent in all of these questions and metaphors is the
notion that the evolving border has faults, and that these faults lead to difficulties and sometimes
operational and structural breakdowns at the border. This perspective is different, and potentially
more instructive, theoretically, and for policy development and action, than the prevailing notion
and simplification of a post-9/11 thickened border as opposed to a thin border which prevailed in
the 20th century.
This paper explores the nature of the faults and the resulting ‘breaking points’ in how the border
works, and does not work, as it encounters change and engages evolution. A theory of border
change, I submit, needs to acknowledge and attempt to define why, where and how breaking points
occur along a boundary. With this knowledge, it may be possible to predict border change processes
and the impacts of change within border regions. The theory that informs this study is examined
before the nature of the breaking points is explored in the context of the border in the Pacific
Northwest, and the potential impact is evaluated through interviews and a questionnaire survey of
informed stakeholders in the border region.
In these recent interviews and the survey, border stakeholders on both sides of the Canada-U.S.
boundary defined ‘breaking points’ in the operation and management of the border, and they
suggested causes and solutions for the difficulties at the border. Yet, the consensus of both
Americans and Canadians, residents of Washington State and the Province of British Columbia, is
that the border between them is not ‘broken’ as portrayed commonly by the media. In the Pacific
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Northwest region, according to stakeholders, the border is viewed as complex and dynamic, with
multiple functions, regional distinctiveness, intra-regional variability, and, indeed, growing pains as it
‘thickens’ with security, technology and infrastructure. The border has expanded both as a human
construct and a national construction to become more immediate and real in the lives of those who
choose to and need to cross, and those who have decided to avoid crossing, or those who are now
explicitly excluded. The 21st century border is a challenge to be engaged, although not necessarily
welcomed, by stakeholders in the Pacific Northwest who identify with and prefer a ‘thinner’ border.
Most stakeholders are, however, engaged in the process of imagining, conceptualizing and building a
better border for the 21st century.
This research report begins with a brief characterization of the border region and difficulties at the
border, before discussing ‘breaking point’ theory and how this approach may help to understand
problems in the operation of the Washington-British Columbia region of the border, and borders
generally. The characteristics of border stakeholders are then reviewed before the findings are
evaluated, first with reference to how the breaking points manifest in the border region, and then
with regard to how and why the border is resilient to these stresses. The discussion continues with
an assessment of stakeholder consensus, and how to make this consensus work. Recommendations
for border policy are offered after the general conclusions of the study.

The United States-Canada Border in the Pacific Northwest Region
The border between the United States and Canada is decidedly regional in character. That is, the
long boundary is one continuous line although the border characteristics and operations are evident
as a series of adjacent cross-border regions. This regional character is well documented and
effectively portrayed in numerous publications (Canada, PRI, 2008, Konrad and Nicol, 2008).
Among these distinctive cross-border regions, none is delineated more effectively and evaluated
more extensively than the Cascadia or Pacific Northwest border region (Loucky, Alper and Day,
2008). The border between the Province of British Columbia and the State of Washington
constitutes the core of this border region, and within this context, the Cascade Gateway comprised
of four associated crossings is the primary corridor for border crossing in the Pacific Northwest
(Map 1). Yet, the smaller, less frequented land border crossings outside the corridor, combined with
the water, rail and air crossings in the cross-border region, are all part of the border system between
Washington and British Columbia. These include water links between Victoria and Port Angeles,
Bellingham, Anacortes and Seattle, the idiosyncratic land crossing at the U.S. territorial outlier of
Point Roberts, rail lines concentrated primarily in the corridor, and the increasingly important land
crossings in the rapidly populating interior of British Columbia and Washington. Expanding air
terminals, not only in Vancouver and Victoria but also in rapidly growing centers such as
Abbotsford, BC, and Bellingham, WA, are part of the system as well.
This extensive cross-border system is evolving and expanding to serve a growing population in the
region, as well as a substantial number of visitors to the international region and the world cities of
Vancouver and Seattle. Much of the growth and change in the cross-border system is concentrated
in the Cascade Gateway and at the air terminals, although changes in crossing patterns are evident as
well at the smaller, interior border crossings. This study is concerned with the entire
Washington/British Columbia cross-border region, although the focus of the interview and survey
work is concentrated in the corridor area or Cascade Gateway, and, to ensure comparison, also a
selection of the crossing points in the interior.
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Map 1. Crossings of the Cascade Gateway (1 Peace Arch/Douglas, 2 Pacific Highway, 3
Lynden/Aldergrove, 4 Sumas/Huntingdon)

Why Does the Border No Longer Seem To Work?
The United States-Canada border has changed. It has not moved; it has not closed. Yet, the border
is different in substantive ways, and this difference, associated as it is with the forces of
securitization and restriction, and attributed largely to U.S. actions, has resulted in visible,
measureable, irreversible, irreconcilable, and even irascible changes (Alden, 2008). The changes are
palpable in many respects but none is more evident than the uncertainty of crossing envisioned by
the public on both sides of the border. The uncertainty looms despite the efforts of both
governments to expand the engagement of the public in identity verification compliance (Abelson
and Wood, 2007). During the last decade the border has been viewed increasingly as hardened, and
this perception has convinced many to stop crossing or to change their crossing patterns, and in
some instances, expedite their crossing certainty and velocity with trusted traveler status (Olmedo,
2005). Many people simply no longer cross because uncertainty extends to crossing time as well, and
in some instances intolerable wait times stop expedited travelers too.
Another change that is both perceived and real is the militarization of the border (Drache, 2004).
For Canadians, and even Americans more familiar with a visible military presence, the border now
appears, and indeed is more ‘armed’ and intimidating. The border is a bigger place bristling with
intrusive technology, more uniformed and armed personnel, prominent barriers and signs with curt
demands. This change, even if it is as much perception as it is reality for the traveler, has been
sufficient to impact crossing frequency and crossing patterns.
3

Aligned with militarization of the border is the increase in regulation and interrogation (Muller,
2010; Salter, 2008). This change is felt both by the crossing public and the firms engaged in business
across the border. The avowed long term objective is more consistent and effective documentation
but the short and intermediate term effect is just more and inconsistent regulation. This regulatory
transition, with its attendant inconsistency, duplication and variation in enforcement creates more
uncertainty.
Uncertainty, militarization, and regulation all cost more money, and more time, which, in a North
American context, is in effect more money. Another dramatic change then is the substantially
increased cost of the border. More personnel, more infrastructure and vastly enhanced technology
have cost both countries billions of dollars.
Driving all of these immense changes at the border are the insecurity environment and the security
imperative. The first force creates a vacuum, or the illusion of one, and the second force fills it.
Herein is apparent the initial, dramatic shift in behavior of the border system. The United States
envisioned a major lack of security at its border with Canada, and the U.S. directed massive waves of
enforcement, regulation and barrier construction at this perceived problem. As these waves broke at
the border, the transformation of the border region ensued from a border regime where well
established procedures prevailed (and, in fact had been streamlined by NAFTA provisions), to a
border zone where transition appeared as the only constant. What appeared initially as relatively
small and ordered shifts in procedure, staffing, protocols, organization and restructuring at and near
the border, soon combined or repelled in such a way, both on either side and across the border, to
cause major changes and result in the disruption of the border system, and in some instances the
breakdown of border processes and border constructs. These may be called ‘breaking points.’

‘Breaking Point’ Theory
Breaking point theory draws on the extensive theory of waves, catastrophe, chaos and critical levels,
now well established in both the physical and social sciences, and it applies concepts derived from
these theories to the conceptualization of the re-bordering or border evolution process (Alligood et
al, 1997, Arnold, 1992, Greene, 1999, Cox, 1992, Gladwell, 2000). A breaking point is
conceptualized as the sudden shift in behavior of a system arising from a small change in
circumstances. This shift may lead to sudden and dramatic circumstances, for example, the
unpredictable timing of a landslide, or the massive gridlock of halted traffic near a border crossing
point. Catastrophe theory, an outgrowth of bifurcation theory, explains that small changes in certain
parameters of a nonlinear system can cause equilibria to appear or to disappear, or to change from
attracting to repelling, and vice versa, thus leading to large and sudden changes of the behavior of
the system. Chaos theory relates to dynamic systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions,
and where small differences in initial conditions yield widely diverging outcomes for systems, thus
rendering prediction difficult if not impossible in the long term. The prediction of change in weather
systems is a good example. Chaotic systems, in addition to being sensitive to initial conditions, also
display topological mixing, that is the property that the system will evolve over time so that any
given region or open set of its phase space will eventually overlap with any other given region. This
transitivity of systemic space is accompanied by a “density of periodic orbits” where every point in
the space is interactive with others. Wave theory, and particularly the breaking wave, contributes
further to the understanding of breaking points by articulating that when a breaking wave’s
amplitude reaches a critical level, a process will suddenly start to occur to cause large amounts of
wave energy to be transformed into turbulent kinetic energy. It is the point of transformation, the
point at which the system changes radically or breaks down, that is of greatest interest in breaking
4

point theory. What causes critical points to degenerate? What are the germs of catastrophic
geometries such as folds and cusps, and the ‘swallowtail,’ ‘butterfly,’ hyperbolic, elliptic, and
parabolic signatures that become evident when systems break down (Alligood et al, 1997, Kellert,
1993, Posten and Stewart, 1998)? At this juncture in theorizing breaking points as related to border
theory, however, characterization of the outcome geometries is less compelling and urgent than
defining the initial conditions, regional topology characteristics and point relationships in the
borderland space.
Borders may look deceptively like linear systems, where catastrophe and chaos theory might not
apply, yet actually the linear boundary is but one part of the system which also includes the crossing
point(s), approaches, and other points and links in the border region or borderland (Konrad and
Nicol, 2004). Border regions in the process of rapid and extensive change immediately invest the
greatest energy of change at the boundary line thus requiring rapid and unformulated response in
other parts of the system. Herein, the initial conditions are created for widely diverging outcomes,
potentially rendering the system chaotic and unresponsive. Change is concentrated at the borderline,
and the consequences of change at the border are unleashed most dramatically and unpredictably at
the border and in the border region.
Re-bordering the United States and Canada, or re-inventing the border between the countries, is
conceived as a massive, complex process with fundamental changes in both the structure of border
crossing activity and the human agency guiding this behavior (Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Drache,
2004). A theory of borders is emerging but it has yet to incorporate the implications of sudden and
extensive change (Brunet-Jailly, 2005, Konrad and Nicol, 2008). Changes in border crossing policy
may impact the relationship between Canada and the United States with consequences for
governance, prosperity, citizenship, growth and progress, and sustainability in both countries, and
more specifically the respective communities along the border and within cross-border regions
(Brunet-Jailly, 2004; Farson, 2006; Nicol, 2005).
Expanded trade under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), for example, has brought with it realignment of trade flows, corridor
development and congestion at the border (Konrad and Nicol, 2004; Gattinger and Hale, 2010). In
the 1990s, border enhancements to accommodate these changes evolved gradually until post-9/11
demands for securitization, and a subsequent specter of trade strangulation, expedited the “works in
progress” as well as initiated new programs to move goods. The United States and Canada,
immediately after 9/11, almost discovered the breaking point or point of dissolution in their
immense cross-border trade (Clarkson in Andreas and Bierstecker, 2003). This potential disaster was
averted because some programs to move goods more effectively across the border were already in
place, or could be expedited, and others were established rapidly, mindful of the need to balance
security and mobility (Konrad and Nicol, 2008). Subsequently, each program implemented to
expedite the movement of goods, whether by truck, by rail, by air or by sea, has in it an inherent
recognition of the threshold level to be attained before there is general acceptance. This critical level,
“the concentration that indicates the division between responsive and non-responsive conditions”
(Kellert, 1993, 32), needs to be identified, recognized and acknowledged by both policy makers and
policy facilitators to guide compliance, and more broadly by the border crossing public in order to
assure acceptance. For example, to handle the staggering amount of truck traffic at the border,
streaming has been initiated to differentiate pre-cleared carriers from those requiring complete
inspection, and scanning equipment has been installed to expedite the truck inspection process
(Bradbury and Turbeville, 2008). Breaking points are evident in this streaming beyond the simple
differentiation of pre-cleared and non-inspected loads. These breaking points may be found in
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maximum acceptable wait times measured by cost factors, or the environmental impact of truck
idling. A “tipping point” effect might occur, where a seemingly small or unrecognized impact such
as diesel truck emissions suddenly raise toxic elements in the air to levels that are unacceptable by
legislated standards accepted by one or both countries (Goldfarb, 2007). The point is that this
seemingly little thing may make a big difference and result in a collateral breakdown in border
functions.
The array or accumulation of breaking points is postulated as changing over time and across space
as one dynamic—re-bordering or re-inventing the border—impacts a range of other dynamic
processes such as securitization and digitalization. This implies that breaking point configurations
will have different signatures at crossings located at different points along the boundary, at different
levels in the border crossing hierarchy of places, and in different cross-border regions. Yet, there
may prove to be consistencies in these signatures among border crossings of similar size or those
found in the same cross-border region.
The theoretical challenge is then to characterize the breaking points in the process components of
border change and evolution. Prominent among these components are securitization, mobility
enhancement, technological advancement, and identity verification. Some of these are linked in
continua such as security and mobility, so that an increase in security may result in a concomitant
reduction in mobility. Dichotomies of goods and people crossing, and human or digital inspection,
as well as scales of regional-national, and transnational-neo-national affiliation, also relate to the
definition of breaking points. This approach promises to provide a conceptual framework for
anticipating “points” or “ranges” where structure and agency may break down in the process of
change at the border. Anticipating these thresholds may assist policy makers to avoid crises resulting
from instances such as the Rouse’s Point, NY/ Lacolle, QC firetruck detainment and Detroit,
MI/Windsor, ON ambulance service halt, or traffic surges between British Columbia and
Washington based on currency value shifts.

Evaluating ‘Breaking Points’ in the Operation of the Washington-British
Columbia Border
In order to evaluate how these breaking points manifest in the Washington-British Columbia border
region, it was important first to collect evidence that would confirm the initial observations in this
region and along the U.S.-Canada border in other regions. The approach involved extensive
evaluation of the border studies literature, and specifically the literature focused on the Pacific
Northwest cross-border region. This assessment was extended to ‘conversations’ with border studies
scholars and border ‘experts’ in the region. In these conversations the main objective was to discern
what was working, and what was not working at the border. This knowledge base provided the
platform for theorizing breaking points as well as developing an approach to evaluating the nature
and impact of these breaking points through empirical analysis of the knowledge, attitudes and
opinions of people in the region who were informed about the border and maintained a ‘stake’ in
the effective operation of the border. This formative step also provided the opportunity to ‘test’ the
emerging ideas and analytical approaches related to breaking points with colleagues at the Border
Policy Research Institute, and others in the Pacific Northwest border region.
The next step in the approach was to refine the research design and to identify a set of questions.
These questions were then re-formulated as a guide for the interviews. The interview questions were
formulated in three groups or sets: those exploring the interviewee’s sense of the 21st century U.S.Canada border, those seeking information, insights, attitudes and opinions on changes at the border
and in the border region, and, finally, those evaluating visions for the border. The questions in each
6

of these three sections were open-ended to allow for extensive discussion with the interviewee. A
copy of the question guide for the interviews is reproduced as Appendix 1 to this report.
The interview list was developed with several parameters. First, every person interviewed needed to
be informed about the border in at least one capacity. This required affiliation with a border
stakeholder group such as enforcement, border community, cross-border business interest,
governance related to the border or academic understanding of the border. These border
stakeholders would be selected from sectors of interest and relationship with the border ranging
from transportation, environment, trade, and tourism, to enforcement and regulation. The objective
was to divide the interviews equally among Americans and Canadians so that there would be a
balance of sectors represented on each side of the border as well as a geographical distribution that
would extend to communities along both sides of the border, from Vancouver Island to the
continental divide. An initial list of names was provided by the International Mobility and Trade
Corridor (IMTC) project’s resource manual (IMTC, 2009). This list was expanded with names
obtained from the BPRI, border related organizations and border stakeholders in both countries.
The objective was to conduct 100 interviews during the Fellowship tenure at the BPRI. During the
period from February to June, 2009, 79 interviews were completed, including several focus group
discussions in the Cascade Gateway and the Okanagan Valley. An additional 19 interviews were
completed in December, 2009, to bring the total to 98. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 90
minutes, with most of the meetings extending between 45 minutes and one hour. Each interview
was recorded in a notebook and on a record sheet with spaces for comments after each question.
Most of the interviewees participated on the condition that the interview would not be electronically
recorded, and that their names would not be acknowledged in any publication.
The interviews provided substantial information and detail about the questions posed as well as
related information on border operation and management throughout the cross-border region.
These data comprised one part of the research deliverables, whereas a stakeholder survey of
attitudes and dispositions toward border issues provided another, more measurable data set of how
the border was viewed in the Pacific Northwest cross-border region. Although the survey results
comprise a useful measure of stakeholder views about the border in their own right, the survey
results and the interview records, together, produce a complementary body of detailed information
about the border.
An attitudinal survey is an effective instrument to reveal, measure and compare how respondents are
disposed to a set of statements which examine dimensions of a subject. My objective in this survey
was to gain a measure of how the border is viewed by stakeholders. Accordingly, the survey was
administered by e-mail to an extensive list of 160 border stakeholders in the cross-border region.
The list included all of the stakeholders interviewed previously and subsequently. The survey was
conducted in the summer and early fall of 2009, initially in July, with two reminders sent in August
and in September.
The survey document is comprised of 50 statements requiring responses on a five point scale
ranging from strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, to strongly disagree. The statements are
grouped in four parts: What is a border? Views on how the United States Canada border works,
Views on border management in the British Columbia and Washington State border region, and
Ideas for a better border. Question 51 allows respondents to offer comments or suggestions. Five
additional questions request demographic information including citizenship, residency, use of border
crossings, stakeholder affiliation and length of experience as a border stakeholder. The questionnaire
and the survey results of the Border Stakeholder Survey are included in Appendix 2 of this report.
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The analysis of the interview data was accomplished in two steps. The initial assessment of the
interview records was carried out in September and October, 2009. The final analysis was completed
after the final interviews were accomplished in December, 2009. This analysis involved reading four
interview record books, the question/answer record sheets and supplementary notes compiled for
some of the joint interviews and the focus groups. Themes were identified from this richly textured
and complex set of response records, and perspectives on questions were recorded as well as
quotations that represented insights, opinions, facts, strategies and ideas of note. The interview data
was treated as a set of narratives, each representative of an individual or group perspective on border
issues. The only effort to quantify these results was the calculation of recurrent themes, ideas and
opinions.
In contrast, the results of the Border Stakeholder Survey were collected with a view toward a
comprehensive statistical analysis. A basic compilation of survey results has been completed and
comparative statistics have been portrayed in numerical and graphic form for the responses to the
statements as well as the demographic variables. Additional multivariate statistical analysis is planned
to evaluate groups of dispositions toward border issues which may be evident in the responses to
scaled statements in the questionnaire. This level of analysis is not required to evaluate the survey
data for the purposes of the current study of views on border issues, and specifically the nature and
impact of breaking points. The combined results of the survey and the interviews comprise the basis
for identifying and explaining views on what is and is not working at the border. These combined
results offer a robust expression of the attitudes, feelings, knowledge and opinions of border
stakeholders regarding the state of the border in the Pacific Northwest.

Border Stakeholders
Border stakeholders are the people who both live near and with a border. Some border stakeholders
work in governance as municipality, state/province and nation-state employees. Others do business
across the border. Some are concerned about cross-border environment and other issues that engage
citizens living near the border. Some have family ties and social connections across the boundary.
Some are Americans who have moved to Canada and others are Canadians who have moved to the
United States. Some are officials who manage security and regulation at the border. Most have a
long and constant relationship with the border whereas a few, the VANOC organizers for example,
become stakeholders only for a brief time.
The border stakeholders interviewed and surveyed in Washington and British Columbia identified
with all of these stakeholder affiliations. The survey of 83 respondents included almost half from
government, 21.3% from education, 17.3% from Business, 6.7% from enforcement and the
remaining 8% from other affiliations, predominantly non-governmental organizations (Figure 1:
Stakeholder Affiliation). A similar pattern of affiliation prevails for the 98 border stakeholders
interviewed between February and June, 2009, and then completed in December of 2009.
Government again accounts for almost half (44.3%), and these respondents are almost evenly
distributed among federal, state/provincial and municipal government agencies, with the largest
number, approximately one third, engaged in transportation whereas the remainder represent
government interests in environment, energy, trade, economic development, diplomacy and
intergovernmental relations. Border stakeholders interviewed in business account for 17.2%, and
this is followed closely by the NGO respondents (13.2%), enforcement (14.7%), and education
(11.1%). Clearly, it was possible to balance the proportion of interviews by affiliation, and distribute
the survey to similarly defined affiliation groups. The response to the survey could not be predicted,
however, and this accounts for the differences in affiliation between the survey and interview groups
8

Figure 1. Stakeholder Affiliation (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009, Konrad/BPRI)
of respondents. The differences are not substantial except in the under-representation of
enforcement respondents to the survey. All of the stakeholders interviewed were asked to complete
the survey subsequent to the interviews. An additional and almost equal number of stakeholderswho
had not been interviewed were also asked to complete the survey. The 83 respondents to the survey
represent stakeholders from both the ‘interviewed’ and ‘not interviewed’ groups, and these
respondents account for a more than 50% response rate to the survey. The affiliation profile of the
border stakeholder interviews and survey is balanced, representative, and comprehensive as a sample
of stakeholder views, perceptions, attitudes and opinions.
The demographic profile is balanced in other ways as well. One half of the respondents to the
survey are American citizens and the other half are comprised of Canadian citizens, a handful of
dual citizens and one foreign national (Figure 2: Stakeholder Citizenship). Stakeholder interviews did
not confirm citizenship information but stakeholder residency was apparent: Canadian 54%,
American 46%. Stakeholder residency for survey respondents is almost opposite with just under
60% Americans and just over 40% Canadians (Figure 3: Stakeholder Residency). Border
stakeholders responding to the survey almost all have at least one to five years experience with the
border, and almost one-half of the respondents claimed 16 years or more (Figure 4: Border
Stakeholder Experience). Almost every one of the respondents uses the border crossings.
Approximately 60% use the Cascade Gateway crossings, under 15% use interior BC/WA crossings
and over 25% use both the Cascade Gateway and the interior crossings (Figure 5: Stakeholder
Border Crossing Use). This result confirms a strong and extensive knowledge of the cross-border
region among survey respondents.
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Figure 2. Stakeholder Citizenship (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009, Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 3. Stakeholder Residency (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009, Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 4. Border Stakeholder Experience (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009, Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 5. Stakeholder Crossing Use (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009, Konrad/BPRI)
11

Stakeholder interviews also confirm the depth of knowledge and understanding of the cross-border
region among all of the interviewees. One apparent divide in knowledge and experience with the
cross-border region is the ‘coast’-‘interior’ division. True to the geography of this mountainous
cross-border region, the stakeholders in the Cascade Gateway and nearby island communities focus
on their part of the region, whereas the stakeholders of the interior valleys, mountains and plateau
differentiate their border experience from those who live in the coastal border communities. In
order to explore the nuance of this difference in perspective, as well as to examine the specificities
of border issue awareness and understanding at the community level, interviews were conducted in
as many border communities as possible in addition to the interviews of stakeholders affiliated with
government agencies, NGOs and institutions representing the various sectors of interest and
expertise, and characteristically situated in urban centers and state/provincial capitals. The interviews
of stakeholders representing sectors such as transportation for example, reveal an extensive
knowledge of border issues throughout the cross-border region, and an aptitude for synoptic
thinking and effective analysis of border effects in transportation. Stakeholders representing
communities, on the other hand, exhibited a greater tendency to focus on community issues and
concerns with the border, where they possessed an acute sense of awareness and insight, rather than
offer speculation about broader border issues, and those concerns outside their area.

The Downside of a Rapidly Evolving Border: ‘Breaking Points’
Stakeholder interviews and the survey both identify and confirm prominent difficulties with the
evolving Canada-United States border generally, and more specifically in the Pacific Northwest
cross-border region of Washington State and British Columbia. These downside factors are often
complex bundles of issues but they may be summarized as six major concerns among the
stakeholders. They are the problem of security primacy, the consensus that waiting at the border is
unacceptable, the realization that thickened borders cause breaking points which in turn affect all
aspects of border operation, the belief that uniform border practices for North America will not
work, the assessment that reactive border policies do not address causes, only symptoms, and the
observation that ports of entry are essentially different with different problems, but policies do not
necessarily reflect this diversity. Each one of these concerns needs to be unpacked because each one
is comprised of interconnected issues revealed in the interviews and in the survey.

The problem of security primacy
How many times since the events of 9/11 have we heard assertions such as ‘security trumps trade’
and ‘security is our first priority’ (Nicol, 2006)? Almost a decade has passed without terrorist
incursions across the border between the United States and Canada, yet the mantra of vigilance has
sustained a primacy for the security imperative that is unrivaled in the history of the Canada-U.S.
relationship. The importance of vigilance is not in question, nor is the value of effective security. The
difficulty lies in the overwhelming weight and presence of the security imperative and its articulation
at the border. In one sense, security enforcement views security in isolation. Security is the primary
consideration and all other concerns become secondary. In another sense, security primacy quite
simply overshadows and obscures other functions of the border. Also, security primacy is like a
magnet that draws other border functions and re-shapes them as security related imperatives. This
makes it difficult to clarify and understand issues surrounding tourism, immigration, transportation,
and trade, for example, because they all need to pass through security filters first. All border functions
become transfigured as security functions. The issue of security primacy, then, is perhaps one of the
most expressive illustrations of how breaking points occur as substantial change and realignment of
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border priorities builds in a massive wave, and the wave breaks to reconfigure and redefine all other
border functions and priorities as security related functions.
Border stakeholders interviewed in this study were almost unanimous in raising concerns about the
overwhelming emphasis on security, and the difficulty of raising this concern in a border ‘climate’
where security was the rule. There was evidence offered as well of two ‘camps,’ each with a defined
position. For those engaged in enforcement, security primacy was acknowledged without
equivocation, although Canadian officials were more inclined to discuss the issue and consider its
collateral impact than their American counterparts. All border stakeholders outside the enforcement
community were in the other camp. Although efforts are being made to dialogue across this
ideological ‘border,’ the positions remain well defined and established.
Responses to the survey are revealing about stakeholder opinions of security primacy. Stakeholders
presented with the statement “A border is there first and foremost to assure our national security”
scored higher on strongly agree and agree columns but also scored high on neutral and disagree
columns, and a few disagreed strongly with the statement (Figure 6a). When offered the more
specific but less emphatic statement “The border between Canada and the U.S. is there to ensure
security,” fewer respondents were neutral or strongly agreed, whereas more either agreed or
disagreed (Figure 6b). The statement “Enhanced border security at the Canada-U.S. border makes
me feel safer” evoked a strong neutral response followed closely by disagreement and strong
disagreement over agreement and strong agreement (Figure 6c). The prospect of increased
militarization of the border caused major concern for most respondents (Figure 6d). What does this
tell us about stakeholder response to security primacy? Although stakeholders acknowledge the
importance of security they are mostly wary of and opposed to security primacy, particularly if this
primacy leads to militarization of the border.

Figure 6a. Survey Response to Statement 1 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 6b. Survey Response to Statement 8 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 6c. Survey Response to Statement 13 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 6d. Survey Response to Statement 16 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Thickened borders--breaking points--extensive and variable impacts
The past eight years have seen a thickening of the border expressed most evidently in the difficulty
and increased time required in border crossing. Thickening is evident as well in expanded border
infrastructure, application of new technologies, increased personnel, more documentation, and,
perhaps most visibly, in the national media attention to difficulties and changes at the border.
Border stakeholders in the BC/WA border region agree strongly that “A ‘thickened’ border is
produced when it takes more time, more money and greater difficulty to get across” (Figure 7a).
They are concerned as well, but not as certain, that “A ‘thickened’ border will cause delays during
the 2010 Olympic Winter Games” (Figure 7b). There is a substantial consensus, however, that “The
problems at the border often compound at the busiest border crossings where they cause the
greatest visible impacts or ‘breaking points’” (Figure 7c).
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Figure 7a. Survey Response to Statement 34 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 7b. Survey Response to Statement 37 (source: Border Stakeholder survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 7c. Survey Response to Statement 38 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
The re-articulation of structure and agency in the process of re-bordering Canada and the United
States has resulted in new configurations of border crossing which enhance and expedite the
mobility of certain people and goods, but curtail the mobility of others (Sparke, 2006). Even the
instances of re-bordering which eventually proved successful have been plagued by crises, false
starts, and highly visible errors in judgment. Indeed, the mistakes have, predictably, garnered much
more attention than successful re-bordering projects such as cargo pre-clearance. A growing, central
and common concern in all Canada-U.S. border contexts is the anticipation of “breaking points,”
“limits,” “thresholds,” “tipping points,” and “critical levels” in the re-bordering process. Knowledge
of such defining levels is crucial to the effective development and implementation of policy, but
these thresholds cannot be surmised by central policy makers without the detailed and localized
experience of stakeholders. The purpose of the research project was to learn from the stakeholders
about what the breaking points were, where and when they occurred, and what could be done to
anticipate them. This is a part of a larger and ongoing project, but the first part is now in place, and
through the stakeholder interviews and survey we can begin to understand how breaking points
develop.
The survey probed a general sense of the nature of breaking points, but the interviews explored
more thoroughly the explicit nature and characteristics of the defining levels. It is not possible to
convey all of the specific breaking points identified by the numerous stakeholders interviewed, but it
is feasible and instructive, in the context of this overview, to outline the prominent groupings of
breaking points, and to illustrate how these thresholds further our understanding of the major
downside factors of a rapidly evolving border. It is important to view these breaking points as derived
from a combination of forces, and, as several stakeholders emphasized, to view them on a
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continuum, related to each other as a group of circumstances that combine to result in problems at
the border. Due to the complexity of border interaction, and the focal nature of crossings, breaking
points are attributable rarely to one factor alone.
Although virtually all of the groupings of breaking points identified by the stakeholders had some
connection to the enhancement of security and the thickening of the border, some of the breaking
points are related directly to the security enforcement regime, and impact the delivery of security
services.
Enforcement officials on both sides of the border reiterated the problems inherent in merging into
different agencies and shifting from revenue collection to security. Lost in transition are well
developed and time honored job specialties, valuation of experience and any semblance of customer
service. Furthermore, the considerable shifts and changes in agency culture coincided with large
numbers of retirements on the one hand and substantial increases in staffing on the other. The
challenges to develop new systems, engage new personnel, establish a reconfigured security
presence, align procedures with new legislation, accommodate new technologies, and develop a new
public image have been substantial for the border agencies. All enforcement officials commented on
the fact that these changes over less than a decade have been problematic. Perhaps one of the
greatest difficulties has been that the changes have differentiated and distanced the security
enforcement regime from the border communities where at one time they were viewed as an integral
component of border life and borderlands.
Stakeholders both inside and outside the security enforcement sector noted the complications
brought about with greater intelligence and issuance of intelligence-caused affidavits. In many
instances this has resulted in expanded enforcement responsibilities for municipalities adjacent to
the border, municipalities whose revenues have been reduced by diminished cross-border traffic due
to security enhancement and economic downturn. Law enforcement has been downloaded to the
municipalities and this has become a considerable financial and human resource burden. Officials in
most municipalities along the boundary, in both countries but more emphatically in the U.S.,
pointed to the increased cost of enforcement downloaded to local governments. Some stakeholders
were quick to add that federal agencies have recognized the situation and redressed the problem, at
least in part, by collaborating with local enforcement where they were stretched, and assisting in
enforcement activities of all kinds and related to constituencies at all levels. Whatcom County, for
example, has received federal financial support for expanded prosecution requirements, and
municipalities throughout the County are receiving assistance ranging from “backup” in
enforcement operations to shared intelligence. Yet, one senior enforcement official commented that
the cooperative efforts depend largely on personal engagement and commitment at all levels rather
than on institutionalized and recognized protocols.
In effect, international cross-border cooperation and institutionalization in enforcement are leading
integration efforts within the countries on either side of the border. Both the Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Northstar are examples where the “primary not collateral duty is
to work on cross-border cooperation” (Canada, RCMP, 2005). These are prominent and highly
visible operations. They are applauded as best practices and showcased as examples of how well
Canada and U.S. enforcement agencies partner. Some enforcement officials, however, added that
more funding is required to make these cross-border cooperative programs truly effective. Border
area enforcement, whether related to the border or to the borderlands, is being stretched and
obliged to adopt new configurations, operations, capabilities and relationships. In the process of
doing so, however, the enforcement community is also deploying a more extensive military presence
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and persona in a cross-border region where a strong military expression at the boundary was
virtually unknown in the 20th century.
“Don’t look at the cameras,” border community residents suggest. We are constantly being watched,
they complain. Yet, they admit that “when something serious happens in our community the Border
Patrol responds.” The cameras, perhaps more than other aspects of enforcement and surveillance,
were mentioned by numerous residents of border communities as the most insidious aspects of the
new border regime, and a true indication of the military order now in place at the border. The
cameras extend the visible and palpable reach of border security enforcement into the border
communities, and into the borderlands. Combined with border patrols throughout the border zone,
the stationary cameras, sensors and security signage establish an apparent and emotional security
zone.
Stakeholders outside the enforcement community commented on the “military culture” that has
developed at the border agencies, and that this culture is manifested in several ways, each leading to
an extended distance and dissonance between the enforcement community and the crossing public.
One is the increased and visible arming of the border. Guns are quite simply break points between
the public and enforcement, and the United States and Canada. The survey results confirm the
considerable concern among stakeholders about guns crossing the border. Officials on both sides of
the border acknowledge that the issue of guns at the border remains a “disconnect” for Americans
and Canadians.
Another concern leading to breaking points between enforcement and the border communities is
the increasing lack of familiarity between officers and the crossing public. “There are so many new
recruits now, and more rotation, so that the community does not know them and they don’t know
you.” Another stakeholder in an interior Washington town at the border commented about the new
border authorities that, furthermore, “they live in Spokane, not in the border communities.” The
centralization of the enforcement authorities has led to reduced feedback and accountability. One
stakeholder referred to this as the culture of “no,” and added that broad interpretations are gone
resulting in more hardship. “At one time officers had more responsibility, and they were more
flexible.” “There used to be part-time officers who were more a part of the community.” Security
enhancement and border thickening have had a distinct impact on the quality of life in border
communities, and have made them revert to being “border towns.”
Yet, although most stakeholders both inside and outside enforcement commented on the downside,
some provided positive comments on how the breaking points could be anticipated and alleviated.
Among these was the observation and recommendation that the border is not and should not be the
‘first line’ but rather the ‘last line’ for security operations, and that this shift in thinking would actually
reduce border thickening and the breaking points resulting from it. Furthermore, this approach
would address what one border official referred to as “wasting our time in primary” and bring about
a review of the “officer-based solution” which invests substantial authority and responsibility in
primary inspection. The enforcement community in large part insists on the critical importance of
sustaining and enhancing primary inspection. So, on the one hand there is the argument that would
build the border and the barrier in place at the boundary line. The other position favors a more
expansive approach to take the primary inspections to where they could be carried out most
effectively and in a timely manner, and preferably away from the boundary line to reduce and limit
congestion and wait times. Preclearance and trusted traveler programs are initial parts of this
approach but it remains to be articulated more fully, before any further implementation is possible.
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The predominant task of primary inspection is to determine the identity of the border crosser
(Salter, 2003). This determination, according to the majority of stakeholders, has become more
complicated rather than simplified and streamlined as intended by the introduction of trusted
traveler programs and the requirements of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
(WHTI)(Abelson and Wood, 2007). Clearly, most people tend to be skeptical and even critical of
new procedures, but the stakeholder response has highlighted issues of confusion about identity
documentation, slow or incomplete marketing of programs, complexity of communication of
documentation issues, and too many identity options. The result has been that identity verification
remains an issue despite the high rate of document compliance in the BC/WA border region.
The potential of NEXUS, and more recently the Enhanced Drivers License (EDL), remain to be
realized. The EDL interview is more difficult for applicants to access outside the Cascades Gateway
resulting in an identification deficit area throughout most of interior Washington and British
Columbia. After investing the time and effort to secure a NEXUS card, trusted travelers may
encounter congestion that exceeds that in regular lanes, as well as restricted hours of operation.
Stakeholders also lamented that it is very easy to lose your NEXUS card for minor infractions which
essentially strip you of your “trusted” status. In a broader context the NEXUS card is criticized as
well for conveying “business class” status on an emerging elite of border crossers (Sparke, 2006).
Then there are the increasing numbers of “bounce backs” who become a problem for local law
enforcement in some instances. Enhanced identity verification procedures by CBSA have uncovered
substantial instances of DUI conviction, and rendered some U.S. border crossers inadmissible, thus
leading to a breaking point. People who have crossed on numerous occasions undetected, and in
many instances innocently unaware of their inadmissibility to Canada, have been halted suddenly and
jolted by the border.
Along with a more incisive focus on identity verification by the border agencies, some stakeholders
observe, is a noticeable shift in the tenor of questioning at the border. “Where is the civility?”
remark these stakeholders. Why do we need to endure “unreasonable questions” and
“intimidation?” Also apparent is a difference in U.S. and Canadian perceptions and prescriptions of
the need for identification and identity verification.
On the U.S. side, according to stakeholders in the tourism industry, the WHTI has “cut the ‘rubber
tire’ of spontaneous travel.” In the minds of travelers in both countries the “easy border” no longer
exists with the implementation of the WHTI and enhanced security procedures. Identity verification
is variously viewed as an imposition, an expense, an added time-consuming requirement, or all of
these things combined. The simple solution advanced by many border stakeholders, a national
identity card system like the one employed by most countries, is not palatable because of concerns
about government contravention of personal rights and freedoms, and identity theft. These
concerns are strong, and particularly strong in the United States.
Many stakeholders lamented the fact that spontaneous travel is no longer an option. Spontaneity
requires ease of crossing and confidence in crossing. Stakeholders see both of these eroded. They
underlined that the border “stresses” seniors more, and there are a substantial and growing number
of seniors living near the entire length of the BC/WA border who may be avoiding crossing. Other
stakeholders note that Canadian seniors are inclined to take organized transportation to U.S. casinos
and shopping venues. Tourism has suffered appreciably due to a lack of reliability in crossing and
crossing time. Travelers view the border differently. They see it as a sustained and constant “barrier”
southbound. (It is the rule). For northbound travelers the boundary is frequently but not
consistently viewed as a barrier. The “inconsistency” of security enforcement on both sides,
however, leads to uncertainty to the point that travel becomes a “discretionary purchase.”
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Stakeholders note that Canadians are more prepared to go south than Americans are prepared to go
north, yet for both Americans and Canadians cross-border travel concerns relate to trepidation
about crossing and waiting at the border. Wait times are the major concern for most, and this
breaking point has lead to more “purposeful” and “multi-purpose travel” resulting in a new
geography of destinations and combinations including recreation, post office stops, shopping,
restaurants, visits to friends and relatives, and business. Places close to or on the border, Blaine,
Lynden and Sumas, once frequented by spontaneous travelers are “bypassed.” After an extended
and often aggravating delay at the border, travelers become tired of the border and “whiz on by,”
comments a resident of Blaine.
As the border thickens, and wait times expand, breaking points lead authorities to post wait times in
order to inform travelers. To avoid the inaccuracies, inconsistencies and lags in website and
overhead electronic sign postings, stakeholders have suggested greater emphasis on personal, autobased GPS information on wait times and cues to prepare documentation. “Know before you go” is
evolving into “know as you go.” Some stakeholders are concerned as well that distinct CBP and
CBSA strategies for accommodating anticipated 2010 Olympics travel are not aligned. One aspect of
this concern lies with the huge VANOC bus requirement which can only be met with the use of
U.S. buses and drivers who will need to cross the border into Canada and then return to the U.S.
after the games. No doubt there will be border stories originating around the 2010 Olympics. The
games are already referred to as the “border Olympics” by some stakeholders. Border stories change
the vision and perception of the border, and this fact will certainly be on the minds of stakeholders
as they prepare for the events and watch them unfold.
The impact of enhanced security on trade has been reviewed extensively, and breaking points have
been identified resulting from greater costs due to regulation, lost time and other predictable factors
(Vance, 2008). Stakeholders in the Pacific Northwest identified a breaking point in the fact that
NAFTA deepened and broadened trade across the border whereas border process and infrastructure
expansion were not aligned with growth in trade. This fundamental problem was exacerbated in the
Cascades Gateway where the economy was more dependent on crossing through a funnel between
large centers removed from the border. Also, according to stakeholders, trade has encountered
breaking points through over-regulation in the trucking industry dominated by smaller firms, and
among smaller retailers due to the downturn of spontaneous travel. “Uncertainty drives out smaller
businesses first” was the refrain repeated constantly by border stakeholders. The “GMC” or gas,
milk and cheese trade has vanished in large part. “High end” acquisitions take travelers further
south. In addition, the point was emphasized that border crossers are not seen as customers,
although more people are now crossing for economic reasons with the downturn of spontaneous
travel.
Lynden, WA, has enjoyed some success in attracting trade by branding itself as an interim and short
term destination. The Dutch theme attracts American visitors on route to Vancouver’s cruise
terminals and Canadians bound south for a day or more of shopping and casinos. Stakeholders in
Lynden suggest that Lynden has fared better than Blaine and Sumas because it does not have the
“border reaction look” but, then, Lynden is located a small yet significant distance from the actual
boundary.
Stakeholders in the transportation sector are well organized, active and engaged across the border
in associations like the Trans-Border Working Group (TBWG) and the International Mobility and
Trade Corridor project (IMTC), yet, a common observation is that the transportation model for the
cross-border region requires a more effective measure of the border, a broader culture and thinking,
and a higher level of system analysis to work. Although TBWG and IMTC are effective, a lack of
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coordination remains among transportation agencies because there are so many, and their interests
overlap and intersect most prominently at the border. A central problem in the merging of traffic of
all kinds, particularly at the highest order crossings, has addressed and averted major breaking points
in cross-border systems. “Once trucks, buses and cars were separated there was a 100%
improvement.” Yet, according to stakeholders, as the systems grow in size and complexity, the
border clearance lag will negate the system advances in nodes, processing points, terminals,
increased berths and other improvements. “The technology is available but the integration and interoperability are not there.” “There is a ten year window for Ottawa and DC, but we poke at
solutions.” Meanwhile, highly visible breaking points such as the halt on the second AMTRAK train
between Seattle and Vancouver gain notoriety, bus travelers need to be viewed as customers rather
than inmates, and forward thinking needs to be directed toward intermodal transportation planning
at the border “plaza.”
One of the observations made most frequently by transportation stakeholders is the expanding west
to east orientation of Fraser Valley traffic fed by population expansion and economic development
and reinforced by a tighter border. This substantial flow of traffic in Canada has “drop down”
effects causing increased utilization of eastern crossing points in the Cascade Gateway.
These observations about transportation lead naturally to a consideration of infrastructure issues. A
prominent stakeholder concern was the need for “intermodal thinking” in an effort to plan to
overcome the “hourglass effects” of the border, lane confusion and blocking, and inevitable
gridlock. One example of such a gridlock occurs when accumulated FAST lane trucks block entry
into other traffic lanes. Another gridlock results just south of Blaine, WA where the new train X-ray
(VACIS) operation blocks two intersections of east-west traffic when the trains are scanned. Larger
scale problems result from the more extensive infrastructure and transportation options on the
Canadian side versus the U.S. side of the border. Infrastructure coordination breaks down across the
border, and infrastructure changes at the border have more gravity. Costs for infrastructure are
accrued differently in the U.S. where they are larger public debt, whereas in Canada they are
characteristically smaller public/private partnerships. On the one hand this results in infrastructures
that do not meet or mesh effectively. This exacerbates an already difficult situation where a rapidly
evolving border gallops ahead of an old and outdated infrastructure resulting in operational breaking
points.
These and many other operational breaking points are acknowledged by border agency planners as
well as community, transportation, and other constituency planners in both countries. Infrastructure
advances are dealing with some of the impacts of increased flows, peak flow pressures and gridlock
problems. Some solutions, more lanes, more booths, more personnel, more port of entry space, are
evident, yet the construction of “smart” and efficient border infrastructure is an evolving process
with lessons to be learned along the way. For example, the new border examination facilities under
construction at Blaine, WA, feature infrastructural advances to stream traffic more effectively
through both primary and secondary examination. Also, there is streaming and differentiation of
secondary examination to avoid mingling and confusion of examination procedures. Such facilities
now exist in the new POE structures immediately across the border. The U.S. and Canadian
facilities, although distinct in architecture, internal design and some functional spaces, do
complement each other to establish a new functional border space astride the historic Peace Arch.
The integration of this border space, incorporating the Arch, parks, and border facilities, remains to
be achieved.
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Photograph 1 The New U.S. Border Facilities at the Peace Arch Crossing, Blaine, WA (credit:
Richard Clark)
The outmoded infrastructure still prevalent along most of the Canada-U.S. boundary is required to
become the platform for a new vigilant technology. This involves retrofitting an advanced
technology on an obsolete infrastructure, again resulting in breaking points in border operation. Add
to this the problem that technology is not fast enough to keep up with border developments, and
that high-tech mobilization is not compatible across the border, and some stakeholders envision
major breaking points emerging in these systems. Technology is certainly a major component in
training border personnel. Some veteran enforcement officers are disturbed by a trend that sees
personnel better trained in the use of technology than “looking people in the eye.” Another high
technology mobilization scenario sees technology playing a major and increasing role in preclearance
away from the border, thus expanding the processing potential at the border and decreasing
breaking points. In the interim, technological advances have enhanced the scrutiny and actually
increased the ability to identify non-eligible cross-border travelers. On the Canadian side, for
example, this technological advance has increased tenfold the ‘turn-aways’ due to DUI convictions.
Stakeholders draw attention to some disturbing trends related to technology enhancements at the
border: technology is being pushed by central authorities with central control; military contractors
are increasingly engaged in the border security business; and, inevitably, technology is replacing trust
at the border.
As one stakeholder notes: “‘trust’ is local. It cannot be mandated by DC.” Community and society
at the border are in transition, and ostensibly threatened by thickening of the border. “We don’t
bowl anymore” states a resident of Blaine, lamenting the previous engagements with neighbors in
White Rock, BC. For some cross-border societies like the Dutch in the Fraser and Nooksack
Valleys, there has been recognizable social breakdown in the cross-border community with the
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thickened border. People do not cross regularly anymore for social and cultural events. Gone is the
“church rush” across the border when you picked up some groceries as well and stopped at the dairy
north of Lynden. The Dutch are not alone in suffering the social impact of a thicker border. East
Indian communities across the border feel the impact as well.
A discontinuity emerges, according to one stakeholder, because transnationals are seen as an asset in
Canada and a problem in the United States. In addition, border problems and breaking points have
created a negative discourse which in turn extends the impact of the difficulties and leads to greater
distance between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ border positions and advocates. ‘Thin’ border advocates assert
surprise at border treatment and assert their right to “customer service,” emphasizing that
“Customers have rights. We have a right to cross the border.” Others decry the lack of civility
among border authorities, and call for a return of the “Peace Arch celebration.” Stakeholders in the
smaller cross-border communities in interior BC/WA claim that cross-border society still works, and
point to symbolic elements like the “six pack border” which continues to allow Canadians to cross
casually for purchases in the U.S. But, “communities at smaller crossings don’t interact as easily and
spontaneously as they once did before 9/11.” Sports teams do not cross as often and there are fewer
joint events. All of these seemingly small changes are part of a larger and potentially debilitating
alteration of borderlands culture (Sadowski-Smith, 2002).
In some sectors of interest and action, environment for example, grass-roots participation no
longer is effectively transboundary as it once was (Norman and Bakker, 2008). Stakeholders in
environmental organizations and in government point to a thicker border which blocks cross-border
integrated action with the result that these stakeholders are working in “silos” on common
environmental problems and cross-border environmental issues. Connections and committees do
not filter down, and community does not filter up. “Something has happened to cross-border
environmental conscience.” “We don’t galvanize around environmental issues across the border the
way we used to.” This problem is ameliorated in the boundary waters realm where the International
Joint Commission remains a cross-border force with 100 years of experience and political clout (Van
Nijnatten and Boardman, 2009). Yet, even here issues arise due to different standards and practices,
and breaking points do emerge.
Some environmental stakeholders do feel, however, that advancements in cross-border cooperation
are being achieved despite the enhanced border and its negative impact on easy and spontaneous
collaboration. One advance is in the area of cross-border air quality alignment where standards may
be invoked and agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, have strong legacies of crossborder cooperation. A second advance is in the area of collaboration on dealing with the flooding of
the Nooksack River with its cross-border impacts in the Abbotsford area. A third area of advance is
with regard to cross-border protection of the Sumas Aquifer.
Border stakeholders point to a long list of issues leading to breaking points in the realm of
governance. Some of these issues are identified in this list.
•

Silos of border programs are run by different agencies but they do not interact. We require
better stakeholder integration.

•

Agreements under the radar of federal agencies are often effective until discovered to be not
binding.

•

“The post 9/11 political discourse about the border narrows as the border thickens.”

•

The border discourse is now in a ‘rule bound’ state.
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•

The WHTI removes discretion on authority.

•

Rapidly evolving border agencies are subject to “mission creep” and “budget seeking.”

•

There has been a marked decline in “port authority.’’

•

There is a liability in outsourcing administration and management to the private sector.

•

“Do we always have to wait for issues? Even the IMTC is reactive.”

•

The energy grid is linked across the border with U.S. Feds connecting with Canadian
provinces. Herein lies a potential for breaking points.

•

“Too much regulation! The collection of fees and taxes is inefficient.”

•

The policy “wonks” and groups are in Washington and Ottawa not at the regional level where
they are needed. Look at the EU models.

•

Usually there is no “border person” in a government department, and it does not happen until
the “parking lot” is evident.

•

“The cross-border discontinuity of ‘enforcement’ versus ‘revenue’ leads to breaking points.”

•

Some cross-border cooperation and integration work better than others. (IBETS vs.
transportation vs. tourism)

•

“Where is the border vision leading border governance?”

•

“No one knows whose job it is to rebuild the border.”

•

“The rapidly evolving border agencies are experiencing breaking points at the same time that
they are attempting to manage a border experiencing breaking points.”

•

Some rule changes are leading to greater consistency whereas others are leading to more
autonomy with the result of breaking points.

•

Changes in enforcement have led to an infrastructure/personnel disconnect.

•

“What laws apply in the ever-thickening bubble zone?”

•

“Top down and bottom up governance are not meeting. Is the IMTC the solution, or just part
of the solution?”

•

The IMTC model works but the IMTC does not have enough money and it continues to be
project driven.

Governance impacts all aspects of border interaction as is apparent from the diversity of issues and
concerns in the list above. Some issue areas, environmental governance foremost among these
(Alper, 2004), have seen substantial research and attention but many border governance issues
remain to be explored thoroughly before they may be better understood (Gilbert, 2005).
The final grouping of breaking point observations relate to the concept of the gateway and
specifically the Cascades Gateway. Stakeholders, generally with extensive experience with the
gateway construct as it emerged, were generous in sharing their thoughts about the gateway and
how it worked. One observation repeated often is that the “sides don’t mesh” and that the lack of
connectivity across the border is a natural source of breaking points.
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Others pointed out that the Cascades Gateway is moving east but that the infrastructure is not
keeping pace. “Surrey is not developing the east-west connections fast enough, and it is worse on
the U.S. side.” A gateway does not work well if all of its parts are not working, but a gateway is
always in transition. It needs a coherent vision. The border effects are different in different
municipalities at the border, and this also changes. Keeping up is a struggle, often pitting ministry
versus municipality, state versus locality.
“Ruralness” along the boundary often pre-empts enhanced connection and connectivity at the
border. With border thickening in the gateway, “distance” is increased, and Canada and the U.S. are
actually farther apart. Keeping this “distance” in mind, planned travel actually aims to go farther, to
Spokane or Seattle, rather than to border communities on the other side.
The process of pre-clearance, while contributing to a more efficient border at the line, also increases
the size of the borderlands zone, placing more people and space into this zone, and therefore
increasing the potential for more breaking points.
The small ports in the gateway see cooperation disappear yet flow through of traffic is enhanced. In
Sumas, for example, “The lunch business is cut.” “Corridors of trust become corridors of transit.”
On the Canadian side, gateway municipalities adjacent to the border are inconsistent in engagement
to plan and develop in concert with the border: Surrey and Abbotsford engage and Aldergrove is
inconsistent. “The Lynden-Aldergrove crossing should be more available. The gateway is not acting
like a gateway.” Some stakeholders even recommend a separate NEXUS port in the gateway to
further stream and channel different flows.
The stakeholder insights provide a base as well for expansion of our thinking about corridors and
gateways. Our inclination is to view corridors and gateways as ever more expedient and efficient
border crossing constructs in a borderlands geography where time and distance have been reduced
at larger border crossings. The evidence in an enhanced security scenario is, however, the opposite.
Rather than achieving the reduction of time and distance through infrastructure, technology,
intelligence, and other advancements, the corridors and gateways actually revert to the restrictive
“hourglass” configurations apparent in border geographies where rapidly moving, multiple lane
traffic meets a security checkpoint. Even a substantial investment in infrastructure, technology and
personnel remains insufficient without an overall cross-border, integrated vision and coordinated
design. One could argue as well that breaking points will continue to occur as long as the gateway
system is evolving, and until “we get it right.” This calls for substantial, coordinated (vertical and
horizontal) planning rather than reactive response to looming crises.

Waiting is unacceptable
The most visible and exasperating difficulty at the border between the United States and Canada is
not terrorism, gun violence, nor illegal immigration. It is the long and usually unpredictable wait to
cross the border. Some would point to this inconvenience and say that Canadians and Americans are
fortunate not to suffer greater indignities or difficulties at our border (Sands, 2009). Yet, we have
become accustomed to an easy, rapid border crossing, not just for personal convenience but for the
way in which we conduct business across the border. Consequently, the public, and the stakeholders
surveyed in this study, find the waiting unacceptable. An overwhelming majority of stakeholders
strongly agreed or agreed “It is unacceptable to wait for an hour or more to cross the Canada-U.S.
border” (Figure 8a). Furthermore, most respondents disagreed that “Wait times at the border are
acceptable if the lost time enhances our security” (Figure 8b). This response pattern suggests that
“security primacy,” unassailable and sacred since the events of 9/11, needs to be reviewed and re-
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Figure 8a. Survey Response to Statement 14 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 8b. Survey Response to Statement 19 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 8c. Survey Response to Statement 30 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
evaluated, and a “new security” approach needs to be considered for the border between the United
States and Canada. “What about safe and porous?”
Wait times are being associated with breaking points in other dimensions, namely environment. As
vehicles idle at check points air quality deteriorates and environmental standards are impacted.
Stakeholders tend to agree that “Increased wait times and border traffic are causing unacceptable air
quality problems at the border crossings of the Cascade Gateway” (Figure 8c). This problem was
recognized and addressed by the Province of British Columbia with the establishment of “no idle”
zones at the Peace Arch crossing.

No common U.S. border policy
Few statements posed in the survey elicited the almost complete, and substantially emphatic
agreement that “The border between Canada and the United States is fundamentally different than
the border between Mexico and the United States” (Figure 9a). All Canadian respondents were
unanimous in agreeing with this statement, and only a handful of American respondents either
disagreed or remained neutral. Offered the statement “All borders operate essentially the same,”
stakeholders disagreed overwhelmingly (Figure 9b). The specific statement “The United States
Department of Homeland Security needs to establish and operate a common border policy for U.S.
boundaries with Mexico, Canada and the Caribbean” also evoked substantial disagreement and some
uncertainty, particularly among U.S. respondents (Figure 9c). These responses are consistent with the
substantial reaction against DHS “common outlook” approaches to dealing with all borders of the
United States. These reactions have come from the northern border states of the U.S. as well as from
Canada, and they have garnered substantial media attention, particularly in Canada. When asked to
comment on the “one border” perspective, stakeholders, including retired U.S. enforcement officials
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Figure 9a. Survey Response to Statement 21 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 9b. Survey Response to Statement 6 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 9c. Survey Response to Statement 22 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
who were willing to speak to the subject, dismissed the notion as uninformed, unworkable and
politically motivated.

Reactive border policies address symptoms not causes
Both American and Canadian stakeholders underlined that the border policies over the last decade
have been reactive rather than established according to strategic plans developed with extensive
research and testing. In the estimation of some stakeholders it is a “constant process of catch up” to
deal with border issues that emerge, and that is what drives policy making for the Canada-U.S.
border. The initial reaction of course was the swift security enhancement that occurred after 9/11.
Some stakeholders interviewed commented that the reactive process engaged after 9/11 has become
a “model” or “template” for dealing with border issues. In a sense policy makers have been spared
the time, effort and money to evaluate a potential issue before initiating a response. Also, the veils of
“national security” have facilitated rapid response, and reduced the requirements of transparency
and accountability. These observations and opinions lead to the disturbing conclusion that we are
building or “re-inventing” a 21st century border without the careful consideration of what really
works, what works best, what is in the interests of Americans and Canadians, and what will last.
If we are not building with an effective and accepted plan, what are we constructing and how are we
doing it? The consensus of stakeholders is that we are addressing symptoms, not causes. Even the
implementation of smart and well articulated new border policies, the “no idle” program at Peace
Arch for example, are viewed among some stakeholders as “band-aid” solutions. The fact that the
policy only holds for southbound traffic supports this view.
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Ports of entry are different with different problems
“Seen a border crossing, seen one border crossing” states a prominent border stakeholder. The
recognition that ports of entry are essentially different with different problems helped to evolve the
“port authority” approach that prevailed in the 20th century. Some stakeholders feel that this proven,
localized, sensitive and effective approach has been lost with the centralization of enforcement, the
reliance on technology and the substantial turnover of staff with retirements and new recruit
expansion. Others feel more strongly that it has been squandered in the rush to establish tighter
controls in the post 9/11 security crisis.
One of the goals of this project was to evaluate stakeholder views outside the Cascade Gateway and
to examine border issues at different ports along the BC/WA boundary. Stakeholders agree that
“Border crossing in the interior of BC and WA have different priorities and issues than those in the
Cascade Gateway” (Figure 10a). Yet, they are split in their opinions about whether “Smaller border
crossings and ports of entry experience fewer and smaller problems” (Figure 10b). In the interviews,
stakeholders raised numerous examples of issues and problems, specific breaking points, and special
characteristics unique to the port of entry, corridor or gateway. Yet, all agreed that some common
issues did prevail at most if not all border crossings. The solution most often cited was to maintain
discretion and “port authority” while relating to national policies, interpreting bi-national accords
with sensitivity, and accessing international data bases. In essence this is thinking and acting, locally,
nationally and globally.

Figure 10a. Survey Response to Statement 41 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 10b. Survey Response to Statement 40 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

The Upside of Canada-U.S. Border Culture: The Border is Not ‘Broken’
The border is not ‘broken’
Reports of a ‘broken’ border are exaggerated. Even in the most difficult of crises along the CanadaU.S. border, the border systems have not been devastated beyond repair. A majority of stakeholders
surveyed disagreed that “The border between the U.S. and Canada is broken” (Figure 11a). The
distinction between acknowledging breaking points and not accepting that the border is broken is
immensely important. Both American and Canadian border stakeholders are quick to point to
difficulties with the border and how it works. This is not because they feel that the border is broken,
but rather it is because they feel grounded in the borderlands culture and confident in the
relationships and arrangements across the border. They value a border that works and they are
committed to making it work. Almost all respondents, both American and Canadian agreed with the
statement “I am confident that the strong borderlands culture that has prevailed between Canada and
the United States will sustain a positive approach to building a better border for the 21st century”
(Figure 11b). The recognition and concurrence that the border is not broken may erode, however, if
the breaking points and the factors contributing to the downside continue to erode stakeholder and the
larger public optimism about a workable border for the 21st century. The remarkable resilience of
border stakeholders to the growing and sustained challenges of dealing with an evolving border has
been a hallmark of the U.S.-Canada border. This patience, and the stoicism of ‘borderlanders’
generally, may not prevail if border crossing conditions do not improve. Already, spontaneous travel
has been curtailed with significant negative results for people living in the border region, particularly
for small business, seniors and those who value social integration across the border. The border is
not broken, but we may find that we are in a period of grace before it does break.
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Figure 11a. Survey Response to Statement 12 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 11b. Survey Response to Statement 50 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Stakeholders know the border and know how to make it work
One of the primary reasons for this lasting confidence is that stakeholders know the border, and,
specifically, they know the border in their region and locality. There are several components to this
commitment. First, there is an exceptional, strong belief that “People who live close to a border
have a stake in the management of the border” (Figure 12a). Almost all stakeholders except for ten
agreed. Only five respondents were neutral. This strong belief is grounded in both American and
Canadian creeds of rights and freedoms, and substantiated by more than a century of benign border
practice. “The border always used to work, and we make it work” claims one stakeholder. This
sentiment, and the general sense that stakeholders know the border, and what is best for the border,
is also reflected in the survey response, yet some of the strength of agreement falls away in response
to “The stakeholders who live and work in our cross-border region know best what is good for this
region” (Figure 12b). Most of the strong agreement, however, moves to the ‘agree’ and ‘neutral’
categories rather than to disagreement with the statement. A similar and consistent pattern of
response is evident to the statement “The most effective way of dealing with ‘breaking points’ is to
develop local solutions” (Figure 12c). Both the survey results and the interviews support a prevailing
view among stakeholders that they know the border, know what is best for the border relationship
in the cross-border region, and can come up with the solutions for problems at the border.

Figure 12a. Survey Response to Statement 7 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 12b. Survey Response to Statement 26 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 12c. Survey Response to Statement 39 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Balanced approaches work best
Yet, these stakeholders are realistic and pragmatic Americans and Canadians who acknowledge and
understand the nature of an international boundary. Unanimously, they endorse a balanced
approach. The response to the survey statement “There needs to be a balance between local
stakeholder (bottom up) and national stakeholder (top down) management of the border in our
region” is overwhelmingly positive with only one person disagreed and six neutral (Figure 13a). A
statement expressing a similar sentiment, with more emphasis on the federal mandate received
almost the same pattern of response (Figure 13b). Clearly, stakeholders acknowledge the role of the
federal government in border management, yet they maintain that this role cannot and should not be
exclusive.
The underlying basis for this belief in balance is due in part to the fundamental understanding
among stakeholders that “A border serves both as a bridge and a boundary” (Figure 13c).
Furthermore, almost all stakeholders agree as well that “The border between the United States and
Canada needs to balance sustained mobility with enhanced security” (Figure 13d). A balanced
approach, the engagement of ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ directions in border management, the
mediation of scales of governance, and, eventually a working model for integrated border
management, are all part of a growing discourse of border management in the Pacific Northwest.
The balance, however, remains to be achieved.

Figure 13a. Survey Response to Statement 32 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 13b. Survey Response to Statement 27 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 13c. Survey Response to Statement 2 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 13d. Survey Response to Statement 9 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Technology and infrastructure are only part of the solution
Enhanced border management through advanced technology and expanded infrastructure remains an
incomplete project as well (Muller, 2009). Also, stakeholders remain to be convinced that technology
and infrastructure comprise the solution to breaking points and other difficulties at the border. The
survey response is positive to the statement “Infrastructure and technology enhancements in the
Cascade Gateway are producing a more effective and efficient border crossing system in the crossborder region” (Figure 14a). A large number of respondents remain neutral indicating that they are
not sufficiently informed and not convinced. Neutral respondents also comprise the second strongest
category to the statement “Transportation infrastructure developments have enhanced mobility
across the border” (Figure 14b). When asked to register an opinion on the potential of technology,
however, respondents were more positive: “Enhanced technology will enable us to build a better
border between the U.S. and Canada” (Figure 14c). Respondents were just slightly more split in their
opinions to the statement “I believe that comparable, consistent and electronic identity verification is
necessary for our borders to work effectively” (Figure 14d). The results of the survey and the
interviews combined show that most stakeholders are supportive of technology and infrastructure
enhancements at the border, yet they remain skeptical about these enhancements as a “blanket
solution” to border problems. Stakeholders interviewed held reservations about “throwing
technology at the problem” and “building and rebuilding a massive border infrastructure.” Some of
the stakeholders were concerned about the costs of constant technological redundancy whereas
others were concerned that massive investments were being made in advanced technology without
sufficient accountability and transparency. The ultimate concern is that these enhancements are
reactive, as indicated earlier in this report, and that no national vision, and certainly no integrated
cross-border strategic plan guides these massive changes at the border.
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Figure 14a. Survey Response to Statement 29 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 14b. Survey Response to Statement 35 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
39

Figure 14c. Survey Response to Statement 10 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 14d. Survey response to Statement 17 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Accommodate regional differences
All stakeholders interviewed in this study acknowledged regional differences along the border
between Canada and the United States, but there were many different approaches offered to
accommodate the regional differences in the management of the border and the development of
border policy. We need to comprehend more fully how this acknowledgement of regional
differences is possible among stakeholders who would advocate very different approaches to
accommodation. The survey posed the statement “The 21st century border between the U.S. and
Canada needs to accommodate regional differences” (Figure 15a). Most stakeholders agreed, few
strongly, and even fewer were opposed or neutral. Yet, even the small opposition does point to the
divergence that begins when stakeholders are asked to align with positions on how to accommodate
regional differences. A very few respondents simply would not accommodate differences. This
divergence is linked to the national/subnational divide in border identification, namely the “two
camp” situation described previously. This is not, however, a simple divergence of federal employees
aligning with a nation first approach and all others living in the region tied to a regional perspective.
A substantial number (approximately 30%) of the stakeholders interviewed and surveyed were active
or retired federal employees in either the U.S. or Canada. Many of these respondents indicated not
only a keen awareness of regional differences but also carefully conceived and articulated solutions.
The key appears to be to engage the national and subnational stakeholders in truly integrated
approaches within regional cross-border contexts. The IMTC is an example of such an engagement.
Almost all stakeholders agreed that “The Pacific Northwest region is developing approaches to the
21st century border (eg. IMTC) that will be useful in other border regions” (Figure 15b). As border
stakeholders in the Cascade Gateway, and in the Pacific Northwest cross-border region more
generally, build collaborative approaches to border challenges that really work, the tendency may be
to engage in more cooperative initiatives rather than the “silo” approaches referred to as the norm
by some of the stakeholders.

Build trust and make it work
Border stakeholders agree with the media pundits and the public at large, particularly in Canada, that
a “trust deficit” has emerged or become more visible between the United States and Canada. It is at
the border where this lack of trust has become apparent. Stakeholders feel that this problem needs
to be addressed. A majority of stakeholders support the statement “We need more trust in the
border relationship between Canada and the United States” (Figure 16a). How do we achieve this
trust? The stakeholders interviewed feel that the IMTC is an excellent example of the development
and reinstatement of cross-border trust, and survey respondents agreed that the IMTC is a
successful example of cooperation (Figure 16b).
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Figure 15a. Survey Response to Statement 43 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 15b. Survey Response to Statement 44 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 16a. Survey Response to Statement 46 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 16b. Survey Response to Statement 31 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Yet, some stakeholders raised the concern that “the IMTC can’t get its business up the line,”
meaning that the IMTC had reduced influence and clout beyond the local and regional level. Many
stakeholders spoke of the need to build cooperation and trust through existing cross-border
constructs such as PNWER and to initiate new approaches to cooperation that would focus directly
on the border and operate at scales beyond gateways and corridors. When pressed on this point,
most felt that both existing structures and new initiatives were desirable, and that coordination
among the stakeholder initiatives was critical. The question remains who or what will have the
political clout to address and solve problems? Currently, PNWER garners substantial clout yet it
does not focus on the border alone. Some stakeholders feel that more focus is possible through the
mechanism of a border forum. The survey statement “We need a ‘Border Forum’ to discuss issues
of security, prosperity and mobility” received substantial endorsement and little opposition although
twenty respondents remained neutral (Figure 17a). More agreed that “A ‘Border Forum’ could link
‘bottom up’ border management with ‘top down’ border regulation” (Figure 17b). The suggestion of
a border ambassador or ombudsman to deal with issues at the border received majority support but
ambivalence and opposition as well (Figure 17c). The idea of a community border ‘watch’ to bring
border issues to the attention of authorities also received a strong neutral response (Figure 17d).

Figure 17a. Survey response to Statement 45 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 17b. Survey Response to Statement 48 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)

Figure 17c. Survey Response to Statement 47 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Figure 17d. Survey Response to Statement 49 (source: Border Stakeholder Survey, 2009,
Konrad/BPRI)
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Stakeholder Consensus?
Whereas the border stakeholders interviewed and surveyed in this study do vary predictably in their
beliefs, attitudes and opinions about the border, and they do advocate different approaches to
dealing with issues at the border, they are consistent to a high degree in their agreement that there
are breaking points and what these breaking points are. Stakeholders are confident as well that these
breaking points do not constitute a broken border. Most important, stakeholders have developed a
loose and formative consensus about what requires attention at the border, and even general
guidelines to achieve a better border for the 21st century. The approaches, however, do remain in the
formative stage as stakeholders explore the different possibilities for more effective border
development and management in a rapidly evolving policy environment.
How do the stakeholders align their consensus? If it is possible to identify consensus groups, it may
be possible as well to suggest or reinforce approaches to make consensus work.
In this study, two prevailing patterns of consensus are apparent. One is the “two camps” notion
introduced with regard to the implementation of expanded and extended security measures. The
interviews and the survey both confirm that stakeholders are polarized into two consensus groups as
the questions and statements relate more directly and explicitly to security imperatives and measures
to ensure security. One group supports security unequivocally, and it hardens its position as
questions are posed about human rights, profiling practices, wait times and militarization of the
border. The other group supports a more open, easy, porous, friendly and recessed border, and it
does so for a vast range of reasons varying from business advantage to liberal ideology. The second
prevailing pattern of consensus is that Canadians and Americans align across the border rather than
on either side of the border. This pattern is evident in the “two camps” because they do extend
across the border. Yet, the pattern is expressed even more demonstrably in a set of consensus
groups aligned with clusters of issues.
These consensus groups are comprised of stakeholders who come together on matters of mutual
concern and interest. Some of these groups have deep roots because issues are recurrent and crossborder collaboration and action is called for on a regular basis. Some are more recent. All of the
groups are dynamic and they are not mutually exclusive. Stakeholders in one consensus group may
align with another consensus group or groups as well. In this study, the groups that are most
apparent are environment, security, trade, mobility and community. The environment consensus
group is well established with a strong history of collaboration in the cross-border region.
Stakeholders in this group originate from a wide range of affiliations in government, business,
organizations and institutions throughout the international region. They are most strongly aligned
with the community consensus group of stakeholders. In contrast, the security consensus group is
the most recent and the most isolated consensus group although some members of this group are
aligned with community, particularly if they are long time residents of the area and retired in the
cross-border region. The community consensus group responds to border issues that affect the
community of the stakeholder and border communities in general. Stakeholders from smaller
communities adjacent to the border form the core of this consensus group whereas stakeholders
from larger communities more removed from and less impacted by the border are more on the
fringes of this consensus group. Trade, like environment, draws from a wide range of affiliations.
This consensus group exhibits the strongest unanimity of response to border issues, next only to the
security consensus group. A final group, mobility, also draws widely with affiliates from all levels of
government as well as organizations and institutions. This consensus group varies to a greater extent
in stakeholder opinions, attitudes, suggestions and positions on border issues related to
transportation and flows in the cross-border region.
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Making Stakeholder Consensus Work: the IMTC and other models
It appears appropriate then that the International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC) has
as its core group of stakeholders representatives of the mobility and trade consensus groups, but
also represents and engages all of the consensus groups identified above. Consensus group
representation and engagement are the approaches of the IMTC.
“The IMTC is a U.S.-Canadian coalition of government and business entities that identifies and
promotes improvements to mobility and security for the four border crossings that connect
Whatcom County, Washington State and the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. Together these
four crossings are called the Cascade Gateway. The goals of the IMTC project are to: 1) Facilitate a
forum for ongoing communication between agencies responsible for regional, cross-border
transportation, safety, and security. 2) Coordinate planning of the Cascade gateway as a
transportation and inspection system rather than as individual border crossings. 3) Improve and
distribute traffic data and information. 4) Identify and pursue improvements to infrastructure,
operations, and information technology.” (IMTC, 2009)
The IMTC was established in 1997, well before the events of 9/11 and the security emphasis that
has ensued and expanded since that time. In this regard the IMTC has provided a venue and a
forum for stakeholder interaction over more than a decade of rapid and extensive change in the
cross-border region and specifically in the Cascade Gateway. Many of the policy responses and
solutions to problems at the border have originated through communication and consultation at the
IMTC. The IMTC model makes stakeholder involvement work, and more important, it makes it
work through consensus group representation and engagement.
Stakeholder consensus as enabled and articulated by the IMTC clearly works to develop and adjust
border policy at the scale of the Cascade Gateway. Can this model work in other corridors and
gateways? Can it work “up the line” at the regional scale, and even at the national scale? When asked
these questions both respondents to the survey and the stakeholders interviewed were uncertain
about how to achieve the exceptional stakeholder engagement and consensus beyond the
“Gateway,” although the stakeholders did suggest that the model should work in other rapidly
changing cross-border “flow” areas. The success of the IMTC at the local to sub-regional level, and
the concomitant lack of a working model for border stakeholder engagement and cooperation at
other scales, underlines the need to explore more fully the options suggested as well as other
alternatives at regional to national scales. Currently, the Pacific Northwest is served effectively in this
regard by PNWER, as are other cross-border regions with similar collaborative governance forums.
Yet, border focused regional forums and organizations do not exist solely to evaluate and build
better border policy.

Conclusions and Border Policy Recommendations
In a parallel study of “Stakeholder Views on Improving Border Management” in the WA/BC border
region, Don Alper and Bryant Hammond report six “common threads” evident in their findings.
They are: 1) The Canada-U.S. border serves a vital security function. 2) Customer service is an
important aspect of border management. 3) Coordination/collaboration is highly important and
should be encouraged to the greatest extent possible. 4) Privacy issues relating to IDs and screening
are not the impediment they are perceived to be. 5) Scale and perspective matters in policy thinking.
6) Border officials and bus company managers agree that bus processing issues need to be addressed
(Alper and Hammond, 2009). Their study, aimed at identifying from detailed interviews of 46
stakeholders what may be done to improve the border management practices, reveals findings
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consistent with those identified for the same region, and from some of the same stakeholders
interviewed and surveyed in my study. Yet, the studies are different in their objectives and approach,
and the findings are different.
This study aims to identify extensive views, dispositions and attitudes about the border, how it has
changed, and what works and does not work. The underlying premise of this research is that it is
theoretically and empirically possible to identify and characterize the breaking points that occur as
the border systems undergo stress and change. These findings lead to policy recommendations
similar to those identified by Alper and Hammond as well as conclusions about the changing
geography of the Canada-United States border in the Washington/British Columbia boundary area.
The findings may be summarized as both downsides and upsides of a rapidly evolving border. On
the top of the downside list is the problem of security primacy. This finding does not question or
disagree with the vital security function of the border acknowledged by stakeholders responding to
both studies. It does underline the importance of recognizing the overwhelming impact of security
primacy on all other functions at or near the border. As one respondent states: “The immense new
security force has taken out the healthy cross-border community.”
This security primacy, as well as other change related factors, are resulting in breaking points of
various kinds and degrees in all sectors of border activity including the security enforcement regime,
identity verification associated with it, travel patterns and practices, trade, transportation systems,
infrastructure, technology applications, social networks across the border, shared environment,
various levels of governance, and the emerging gateway construct at the center of the evolving
border region. Changes inevitably lead to discontinuities and these lead to breaking points as
illustrated both theoretically and empirically in this research. And discontinuities lead to faults that
halt systems.
The result is waiting, and stakeholders in this region, as well as elsewhere along the Canada-U.S.
border do not tolerate waiting. “We live in a border area where waiting has little historical precedent
or currency” offers one stakeholder. Another adds: “We shouldn’t wait to move from one globalized
country to another when all of our other communications are expedited.”
Yet, whereas stakeholders acknowledge growing North American globalization and interaction, they
are quick to emphasize that no common border policy will work for all U.S. borders, and that the
border between Mexico and the U.S. differs substantially from the border between the U.S. and
Canada. Indeed, some stakeholders point to statements of common border policy as an indication of
reaction without careful consideration of the facts and patterns, and without planning based on local
and regional border experience.
Reactive border policies address symptoms, not causes of problems, claim most of the border
stakeholders. These reactive policies, furthermore, may lead to breaking points more easily and
directly because inherent in these policies are the initial conditions of destabilization.
Finally, stakeholders recognize that ports-of-entry are all different, and that all POEs have unique
circumstances and different issues. They are after all complex interaction loci where different crossborder flows and scenarios occur, and consequently standardized and centrally tailored policies need
to be adjusted in order to avoid breaking points.
With all of these downsides and potential faults in the evolving cross-border systems, it may appear
strange that the breaking points that have occurred also have not resulted in a massive collapse in
the operation of the border. Actually, the closest point to breakdown occurred immediately after the
events of 9/11 when the border was closed momentarily by the U.S. Since then, and despite
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drastically enhanced security measures the border has not broken. This is clearly an upside.
Stakeholders acknowledge that the border is not broken, they recognize that there is an underlying
culture of cooperation and collaboration at work, and as Alper and Hammond confirm, these
stakeholders are proud of the effective operation of the border in the Pacific Northwest.
The stakeholders are unanimous in their insistence that this is due in large part to the fact that
stakeholders know the border, they know how to make it work, and they are asked to participate in
making it work.
By their very nature border relationships are efforts in balance. Stakeholders recognize this and
constantly advocate balanced approaches to border issues because from their experience these
balanced approaches work best, and eventually border policy must come down to compromise and
adjustment between sovereignties, particularly at the local level where interaction is constant and
extensive.
Nowhere is balance more important than in the adoption and implementation of new technologies
and the extensive construction and reconfiguration of infrastructure. Stakeholders caution that these
infrastructural and technological advances need to be measured and planned in coordination with
other changes at the border. This message is being heard as stakeholders work together across
sectoral interests and silos of management and authority to build a better border for the 21st century.
Another message that resounds from the stakeholders is the need to accommodate regional
differences. This message too is being acknowledged by federal representatives in the region and
increasingly by Ottawa and Washington, DC.
Finally, and perhaps most gratifying is the evidence that stakeholders are building and re-building
trust at the local and regional level through structures like the IMTC and PNWER, and making it
work in the border region of the Pacific Northwest.
This study concurs with the conclusion of Alper and Hammond that stakeholders are critical in the
process of developing effective border policy. In fact, that is one of the major findings of this study
and it underscores the importance of supporting and facilitating the work of border stakeholders
and stakeholder groups as they dedicate time and effort to building a better border. Border
management policies are ideally a combination of top down national laws and guidance and bottom
up best practices based on relationships and experiences that make the border work. This
acknowledgement in the Pacific Northwest, and specifically in the Cascade Gateway and other
crossings between Washington State and British Columbia, has led to innovations such as NEXUS,
IBETs and the EDL. More innovation and effective border management are imminent if the border
stakeholder community is nurtured, challenged and supported in its work, for inherent in this
community are the very ideals which form, as one enforcement official states so succinctly, “the
commonality that holds us together across this border.” Our goal, he goes on to say is the “balance
of free flow and trade with well being and safety.”
In order to achieve this goal, we need to acknowledge the breaking points and go about fixing them.
In some instances this may be accomplished by addressing individual problems. Yet, the
recommendations that follow are aimed at addressing broader concerns underlying these breaking
points outlined previously in the report and listed in these conclusions. The five recommendations
are derived from the current stakeholder survey and interview project and placed in the context of
other border research on the Canada-U.S. border, and border regions more generally. They are:
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1) Empower Stakeholders
Border stakeholders need to be encouraged and supported in their efforts to help with the immense
task of guiding the evolution of their border. This requires financial support, organization,
facilitation and many other aspects, but foremost it requires recognition of their role and their
contribution.
2) Encourage Cooperation
This recommendation has been identified by most border researchers and observers but it bears
repetition and emphasis. It is important to emphasize this point as well during periods of extensive
change at the border when new personnel, new rules, new operational guidelines, and new
imperatives tend to reinforce old silos of operation and develop new ones.
3) Humanize Security
The finding of security primacy, and the numerous references by stakeholders to militarization and
even intimidation at the border, need to be addressed. Humanizing security should be just as much
of an imperative as making certain that security is effective and efficient. More civility is required.
This recommendation aligns with the stakeholder call for “customer service” reported by Alper and
Hammond.
4) Acknowledge Diversity
Canada and the United States are both immigrant nations where diversity is a fact of life. Visible
minorities are growing in number and representation among our citizenry. Yet, some procedures at
the border, carried out ostensibly to protect our countries and enhance security and safety, do not
acknowledge diversity. This needs to change.
5) Manage Change
Changes at the Canada-U.S. border over the last decade have been enormous, and seemingly beyond
our control, and perhaps even out of control. In the second decade of the 21st century we need to
manage change at the border by implementing coordinated cross-border planning developed with
vision, through collaboration, with the integrity grounded in our time-honored border relationship.
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Appendix 1: Interview and Survey Documents
Text of letter soliciting project participation:

Border Policy Research Institute
Western Washington University
516 High Street
Bellingham, WA 98225-9110
Phone: 360-650-3728
Fax: 360-650-3995
Dear border stakeholder,
RE: ‘Breaking Points’ project directed by Dr. Victor Konrad, Visiting Fellow, BPRI, 2009
During the past five months I have been engaged in the study of changes at the border in the Pacific
Northwest region. I have examined how these changes in traffic patterns, intensified scrutiny, new
technologies, rules, and reporting requirements, and more, have impacted the systems of security,
transportation, trade, tourism, environment and other aspects of the border exchange structure and
culture. Discussions with more than 70 border stakeholders confirm that changes within or between
systems are sufficient to disrupt or halt the use and operation of systems and lead to breaking points.
My project has been aimed at defining the nature and occurrence of breaking points in border operation
and management, learning about how they emerge, establishing a model to characterize their impact,
and developing policy implications.
In order to place this research into context, I am contacting all of the stakeholders who I have
interviewed, as well as some that I have not yet had an opportunity to speak with. I am asking you to
respond to a series of questions that will provide a ‘base line’ for all of the information gained from the
interviews completed to date, and those that remain to be scheduled. This questionnaire aims to
explore the views of informed stakeholders about borders, the border between Canada and the United
States, and more specifically the border in the Pacific Northwest region shared by Washington State and
British Columbia. The results of the survey will be used along with the information gained from the
discussions with border stakeholders, in order to develop public policy recommendations for border
operation and management. The results of the study will be published first by the BPRI, and
subsequently as part of my next book on the U.S.-Canada border.
Thank you for responding to the following survey. Your contribution is appreciated.
Victor Konrad
Visiting Fellow
Border Policy Research Institute
Western Washington University
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Text of handout describing project goals:
Stakeholders’ Views on the 21st Century Border in the Washington/British
Columbia Region
Goals of the Research Project
The border between the United States and Canada remains in place yet there have been
substantial changes over the past 20 years in how the border functions, appears, and impacts
those who cross it. The changes have led to increased attention to the border by the media,
and increased concerns about border crossing by the public in both Canada and the United
States. Federal governments in both countries have moved to assure secure borders, and
governments at all levels have worked to sustain mobility, trade and interaction across the
boundary. Local and regional stakeholders have emerged to challenge and work with border
authorities to build a better border for the 21st century.
The purpose of my study is to collect and examine the views of a representation of border
stakeholders in the Pacific Northwest region about what has changed at the border, and what
works and does not work in the new era of border management. The project involves
interviews and discussions with stakeholders as well as a stakeholder survey.
My goals are to:
1. Identify the perceived changes in how the border works.
2. Examine the changes in border operation, function, management and effectiveness in
the context of emerging border theory.
3. Obtain ideas and insights about border ‘best practices’ in the BC/WA border region.
4. Evaluate the consensus and differences among stakeholder sectors (enforcement,
business, tourism, transportation etc.).
5. Compare views of stakeholders in the Cascade Gateway with those in other localities
along the WA/BC boundary.
6. Compare views of stakeholders in Canada and the United States.
Dr. Victor Konrad
Research Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
Visiting Fellow, Border Policy Research Institute
Western Washington University, Bellingham WA (January-June, 2009)
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Text of questionnaire:

Please respond to the questions from the perspective of your stakeholder group.
The 21st Century United States-Canada Border
1. In your estimation what is the most important or defining characteristic of the border
between the United States and Canada?
2. What are the most important functions of the border?
3. Do Canada and the United States have a special border relationship? If so, why? If not,
why not?
Changes at the Canada-United States Border
4. During the past 20 years what changes at the border have been most significant? During
the past 10 years what changes have been the most significant?
5. Have these changes been handled effectively by border stakeholders? How?
6. What could be handled better to establish a more effective border?
Visions for the Border in the Pacific Northwest
7. Does stakeholder engagement and participation in border management work? If yes,
how? If no, why not?
8. What form of stakeholder engagement works best? IMTC? Stakeholder forum?
Ombudsman? Border ‘watch’? Other?
9. Is the border management and stakeholder interaction in the PNW region an effective
model for other border regions? Why?
Dr. Victor Konrad
Research Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
Visiting Fellow, Border Policy Research institute
Western Washington University, Bellingham WA (January-June, 2009)
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$SSHQGL[Border Stakeholder Survey5HVXOWV
1. A border is there first and foremost to assure our national security.
strongly
agree
1

25.3%
(21)

agree

neutral

disagree

28.9%

20.5%

20.5%

(24)

(17)

(17)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

4.8% (4)

2.51

83

answered question

83

skipped question

0

2. A border serves both as a bridge and a boundary.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

41.0%

47.0%

(34)

(39)

6.0% (5)

6.0% (5)

agree
2

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.77

83

answered question

83

skipped question

0

3. A border between two countries has multiple functions.
strongly
agree
3

agree

59.0%

39.8%

(49)

(33)



neutral

disagree

1.2% (1)

0.0% (0)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.42

83

answered question

83

skipped question

0

4. A border mediates between two countries.
strongly

agree

neutral

18.1%

38.6%

36.1%

(15)

(32)

(30)

agree
4

disagree

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.4% (2)

2.35

83

answered question

83

skipped question

0

4.8% (4)

5. A border between two countries is constantly subject to change.
strongly
agree
5

16.9%
(14)

agree

neutral

disagree

37.3%

25.3%

16.9%

(31)

(21)

(14)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

3.6% (3)

2.53

83

answered question

83

skipped question

0

6. All borders operate essentially the same.
strongly
agree
6

1.2% (1)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

agree

neutral

disagree

6.0% (5)

8.4% (7)

53.0%

31.3%

(44)

(26)

4.07

83

answered question

83

skipped question

0

7. People who live close to a border have a stake in the management of the border.
strongly

agree

neutral

39.8%

42.2%

(33)

(35)

6.0% (5)

agree
7



disagree
12.0%
(10)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.90

83

answered question

83

skipped question

0

8. The border between Canada and the U.S. is there to ensure security.
strongly
agree
8

9.9% (8)

agree

neutral

disagree

43.2%

18.5%

25.9%

(35)

(15)

(21)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

2.68

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

9. The border between the United States and Canada needs to balance sustained mobility with enhanced security.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

43.2%

44.4%

(35)

(36)

8.6% (7)

3.7% (3)

agree
9

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.73

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

10. Enhanced technology will enable us to build a better border between the U.S. and Canada.
strongly

agree

neutral

25.9%

45.7%

24.7%

(21)

(37)

(20)

agree
10

disagree

3.7% (3)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.06

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

11. Enhanced border security makes it more difficult to do business between the United States and Canada.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

24.7%

44.4%

13.6%

14.8%

(20)

(36)

(11)

(12)

agree
11



strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

2.26

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

12. The border between the U.S. and Canada is broken.
strongly

12

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

agree

neutral

disagree

12.3%

17.3%

19.8%

35.8%

14.8%

(10)

(14)

(16)

(29)

(12)

agree

3.23

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

13. Enhanced security at the Canada-U.S. border makes me feel safer.
strongly
agree
13

3.7% (3)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

agree

neutral

disagree

19.8%

32.1%

30.9%

13.6%

(26)

(25)

(11)

(16)

3.31

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

14. It is unacceptable to wait for an hour or more to cross the Canada-U.S. border.
strongly
agree
14

agree

44.4%

37.0%

(36)

(30)

neutral

disagree

11.1% (9)

7.4% (6)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.81

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

15. Doing business across the border has become more complex.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

34.6%

53.1%

(28)

(43)

8.6% (7)

3.7% (3)

agree
15



strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.81

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

16. I am concerned about the increased militarization of the border between the United States and Canada.
strongly
agree
16

agree

39.5%

30.9%

(32)

(25)

neutral

9.9% (8)

disagree
17.3%
(14)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

2.12

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

17. I believe that comparable, consistent and electronic identity verification is necessary for our borders to work
effectively.
strongly

agree

neutral

17.3%

44.4%

25.9%

(14)

(36)

(21)

agree
17

disagree

9.9% (8)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

2.36

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

18. I believe that all Canadians and Americans should carry identity cards when crossing the border.
strongly

agree

neutral

17.3%

51.9%

21.0%

(14)

(42)

(17)

agree
18



disagree

7.4% (6)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

2.26

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

19. Wait times at the border are acceptable if the lost time enhances our security.
strongly
agree
19

3.7% (3)

agree

neutral

disagree

24.7%

23.5%

45.7%

(20)

(19)

(37)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

3.19

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

20. The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative has enhanced identity verification at land and sea crossings between
the U.S. and Canada.
strongly
agree
20

7.4% (6)

agree

neutral

disagree

46.9%

33.3%

12.3%

(38)

(27)

(10)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.51

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

21. The border between Canada and the United States is fundamentally different than the border between Mexico
and the United States.
strongly
agree
21

agree

48.1%

40.7%

(39)

(33)

6

neutral

disagree

6.2% (5)

3.7% (3)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

1.2% (1)

1.69

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

22. The United States Department of Homeland Security needs to establish and operate a common border policy
for U.S. boundaries with Mexico, Canada and the Caribbean.
strongly
agree
22

4.9% (4)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

agree

neutral

disagree

16.0%

18.5%

43.2%

17.3%

(13)

(15)

(35)

(14)

3.52

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

23. The border exists primarily to stop illegal immigration.
strongly
agree
23

1.2% (1)

agree

9.9% (8)

neutral

disagree

12.3%

66.7%

(10)

(54)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

9.9% (8)

3.74

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

24. I am concerned about the guns that cross the border.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

18.5%

40.7%

22.2%

13.6%

(15)

(33)

(18)

(11)

agree
24

6

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

4.9% (4)

2.46

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

25. You can’t stop smuggling across the Canada-U.S. border.
strongly
agree
25

9.9% (8)

agree

neutral

disagree

43.2%

25.9%

14.8%

(35)

(21)

(12)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

6.2% (5)

2.64

81

answered question

81

skipped question

2

26. The stakeholders who live and work in our cross-border region know best what is good for this region.
strongly
agree
26

15.2%
(12)

agree

neutral

disagree

46.8%

22.8%

15.2%

(37)

(18)

(12)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.38

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

27. The border is most effectively managed through cooperation between federal agencies mandated to regulate
the border and regional stakeholders at the border.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

29.1%

55.7%

(23)

(44)

11.4% (9)

3.8% (3)

agree
27

6

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.90

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

28. The Enhanced Drivers License (EDL) program for BC and WA is a good program to achieve identity
verification at the border.
strongly

agree

neutral

20.3%

54.4%

20.3%

(16)

(43)

(16)

agree
28

disagree

5.1% (4)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.10

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

29. Infrastructure and technology enhancements in the Cascade Gateway are producing a more effective and
efficient border crossing system in the cross-border region.
strongly
agree
29

8.9% (7)

agree

neutral

disagree

43.0%

35.4%

12.7%

(34)

(28)

(10)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.52

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

30. Increased wait times and border traffic are causing unacceptable air quality problems at the border crossings
of the Cascade Gateway.
strongly
agree
30

7.6% (6)

agree

neutral

50.6%

34.2%

(40)

(27)

6

disagree

6.3% (5)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

1.3% (1)

2.43

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

31. The International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC) is a successful example of cross-border
cooperation.
strongly

agree

neutral

34.2%

38.0%

26.6%

(27)

(30)

(21)

agree
31

disagree

1.3% (1)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.95

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

32. There needs to be a balance between local stakeholder (bottom up) and national stakeholder (top down)
management of the border in our region.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

32.9%

58.2%

(26)

(46)

7.6% (6)

1.3% (1)

agree
32

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.77

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

33. Border issues in the Pacific Northwest are different than those in other cross-border regions between Canada
and the United States.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

20.3%

39.2%

26.6%

12.7%

(16)

(31)

(21)

(10)

agree
33

6

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

1.3% (1)

2.35

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

34. A ‘thickened’ border is produced when it takes more time, more money and greater difficulty to get across.
strongly

agree

neutral

29.1%

53.2%

12.7%

(23)

(42)

(10)

agree
34

disagree

3.8% (3)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

1.3% (1)

1.95

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

35. Transportation infrastructure developments have enhanced mobility across the border.
strongly
agree
35

7.6% (6)

agree

neutral

disagree

49.4%

25.3%

17.7%

(39)

(20)

(14)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.53

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

36. ‘Thickening’ the border has caused environmental damage in the cross-border region.
strongly
agree
36

10.1% (8)

agree

neutral

40.5%

38.0%

(32)

(30)

disagree

8.9% (7)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

2.53

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

37. A ‘thickened’ border will cause delays during the 2010 Olympic Winter Games.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

19.0%

41.8%

24.1%

15.2%

(15)

(33)

(19)

(12)

agree
37

6

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.35

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

38. The problems at the border often compound at the busiest crossings where they cause the greatest visible
impacts, or ‘breaking points’.
strongly

agree

neutral

22.8%

55.7%

17.7%

(18)

(44)

(14)

agree
38

disagree

3.8% (3)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.03

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

39. The most effective way of dealing with ‘breaking points’ at the border is to develop local solutions.
strongly

agree

neutral

12.7%

55.7%

24.1%

(10)

(44)

(19)

agree
39

disagree

7.6% (6)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.27

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

40. Smaller border crossings and ports of entry experience fewer and smaller problems.
strongly
agree
40

8.9% (7)

agree

neutral

disagree

31.6%

29.1%

27.8%

(25)

(23)

(22)



strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

2.84

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

41. Border crossings in the interior of BC and WA have different priorities and issues than those in the Cascade
Gateway.
strongly

agree

neutral

12.7%

59.5%

17.7%

(10)

(47)

(14)

agree
41

disagree

7.6% (6)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

2.5% (2)

2.28

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

42. Small border crossings in the BC/WA cross-border region should all use one common facility.
strongly
agree
42

6.3% (5)

agree

neutral

disagree

17.7%

35.4%

31.6%

(14)

(28)

(25)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

8.9% (7)

3.19

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

43. The 21st century border between the U.S. and Canada needs to accommodate regional differences.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

21.5%

67.1%

(17)

(53)

6.3% (5)

5.1% (4)

agree
43

7

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.95

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

44. The Pacific Northwest region is developing approaches to the 21st century border (eg. IMTC) that will be useful
in other border regions.
strongly

agree

neutral

30.4%

55.7%

12.7%

(24)

(44)

(10)

agree
44

disagree

1.3% (1)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

1.85

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

45. We need a ‘Border Forum’ to discuss issues of security, prosperity and mobility.
strongly

agree

neutral

25.3%

43.0%

25.3%

(20)

(34)

(20)

agree
45

disagree

6.3% (5)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.13

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

46. We need more trust in the border relationship between Canada and the United States.
strongly

agree

neutral

34.2%

35.4%

25.3%

(27)

(28)

(20)

agree
46

7

disagree

5.1% (4)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.01

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

47. We need a border ambassador or ombudsman to deal with issues that arise at the border.
strongly

agree

neutral

disagree

17.7%

35.4%

29.1%

16.5%

(14)

(28)

(23)

(13)

agree
47

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

1.3% (1)

2.48

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

48. A ‘Border Forum’ could link ‘bottom up’ border management with ‘top down’ border regulation.
strongly

agree

neutral

21.5%

54.4%

17.7%

(17)

(43)

(14)

agree
48

disagree

6.3% (5)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.09

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

49. A community border ‘watch’ program may be effective to bring border issues to the attention of authorities.
strongly
agree
49

11.4% (9)

agree

neutral

disagree

36.7%

38.0%

(29)

(30)

10.1% (8)

7

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

3.8% (3)

2.58

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

50. I am confident that the strong borderlands culture that has prevailed between Canada and the United States
will sustain a positive approach to building a better border for the 21st century.
strongly

agree

neutral

17.7%

58.2%

19.0%

(14)

(46)

(15)

agree
50

disagree

5.1% (4)

strongly

Rating

Response

disagree

Average

Count

0.0% (0)

2.11

79

answered question

79

skipped question

4

51. This is a space to offer your comments or suggestions:
Response
Count
15
answered question

15

skipped question

68

Response

Response

Percent

Count

52. Citizenship

United States Citizen

50.7%

38

Canadian Citizen

40.0%

30

Dual Citizen (CAN/US)

8.0%

6

Other

1.3%

1

answered question

75

skipped question

8

7

53. Residency
Response

Response

Percent

Count

Resident of USA

57.3%

43

Resident of Canada

42.7%

32

answered question

75

skipped question

8

Response

Response

Percent

Count

54. User of:

Cascade Gateway

57.3%

43

Interior BC/WA crossing

10.7%

8

All of the above

29.3%

22

None of the above

2.7%

2

answered question

75

skipped question

8

7

55. Select one stakeholder affiliation:
Response

Response

Percent

Count

Business

17.3%

13

Education

21.3%

16

Enforcement

6.7%

5

Government

46.7%

35

Other (please specify)

8.0%

6

Other

7

answered question

75

skipped question

8

Response

Response

Percent

Count

56. Border stakeholder for

less than 1 year

4.0%

3

1 to 5 years

16.0%

12

6 to 10 years

18.7%

14

11 to 15 years

14.7%

11

16 years or more

46.7%

35

answered question

75

skipped question

8

7

